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while the deployment of more BMd 
interceptors will be a purely american 
decision, such an expansion will have 
implications for U.S. defense rela-
tions with Canada. this is because of 
the existence of the North american 
aerospace defense Command 
(Norad), a unique “bi-national” 
command staffed with both american 
and Canadian military personnel 
which, since 1957, has had respon-
sibility for the aerospace defense of 
both countries. originally postured 
to defend the continent against the 
threat of Soviet long-range bomb-
ers by providing a single command 
for the operational control of assigned 
american and Canadian air defense 
forces, Norad in subsequent years 
has taken on additional responsibility 
for warning of ballistic missile attack 
and space surveillance. 
But Norad never had a real opera-
tional BMd function. during the Cold 
war, the United States did not deploy it 
and there was no capability to inter-
cept Soviet nuclear-armed ground and 
sea-launched intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles (iCBMs and SlBMs) before 
they reached their military and urban 
targets in the U.S. or Canada. the 
“defense” of North america lay instead 
in the deterrent power of the american 
strategic-nuclear offensive capability. 
the absence of an american BMd 
system meant that Canada, although 
involved through Norad in missile 
warning, could eschew a role in BMd, 
a situation that ref lected Canadian 
policy preferences. 
with the advent of new post-Cold war 
missile threats and the deployment by 
the United States of a limited BMd 
system directed against North korea 
and other “rogue” states, the U.S. 
has now moved to deploy a limited 
BMd system of radars and intercep-
tors. these capabilities were not placed 
under Norad’s operational control, 
although as the command responsible 
for the continent’s aerospace defense 
this might have been seen as a logical 
step. here again, the government in 
ottawa has resisted direct participation 
in BMd, and adjustments were made at 
Norad to accommodate Canadian 
reluctance. with washington now set 
to expand its BMd system, including 
along the border with Canada, ottawa’s 
position may no longer be tenable and 
as such the future of Norad as a bi-
national command is in question.
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when newly sworn in U.S. Secretary of defense Chuck hagel announced in early 2013 that in response to the growing threat 
from North korea, 14 new Ballistic Missile defense 
(BMd) interceptors would be added to the 30 already 
in place in California and alaska, the Wall Street Journal 
called it “one of the biggest switcheroos of the obama 
Presidency.” whether the administration is prepared  
to go much further still is not clear. a September  
2012 report by the U.S. National research Council 
(Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense) called for a 
gradual buildup of the system, specifically mentioning 
Fort drum, Ny and northern Maine as possible  
BMd locations. 
Speaking in kingston, ontario 
in 1938, President Franklin 
roosevelt declared that  
the United States would not  
stand idly by if Canada were  
ever threatened.
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Missile Defense and the 
Obligations of a “Good and 
Friendly Neighbour”
Speaking in kingston, ontario in 
1938, President Franklin roosevelt 
declared that the United States would 
not stand idly by if Canada were ever 
threatened. in response, then Prime 
Minister w. l. Mackenzie king said 
that Canada’s obligation as a “good and 
friendly neighbour” was to see to it that 
enemy forces did not attack the U.S. by 
land, sea or air by way of Canada. the 
essence of the bilateral security rela-
tionship—its close, friendly and coop-
erative nature notwithstanding—is 
that Canada cannot become a security 
liability for the U.S. 
this obligation took on new mean-
ing after world war two as the Soviet 
Union developed atomic weapons and  
a long-range bomber force capable of 
f lying over the North Pole en route to 
the U.S. Suddenly, Canada became, 
in the words of american Secretary 
of State John Foster dulles, a “very 
important piece of real estate.” Canada 
understood and readily embraced its 
new position. as the Cold war deep-
ened in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
ottawa joined with washington to cre-
ate a strong western deterrent in europe 
through the North atlantic treaty 
organization (Nato) and in North 
america in the development of radar 
lines in the Canadian north backed 
by interceptor aircraft to provide for 
continental air defence. in 1957, these 
combined efforts were brought together 
under a single operational command, 
Norad, with an american general 
in charge who reported directly to each 
government, a Canadian deputy, and a 
combined bi-national headquarters at 
Colorado Springs. 
No sooner had Norad been estab-
lished to defend against the bomber, 
then the “missile became the message” 
and Canada’s strategic importance, 
along with the Canadian and american 
air defence systems declined. our best 
bet was deterrence and deterrence 
depended on good warning. Ballistic 
missiles (whether iCBMs launched 
from the USSr or SlBMs fired from 
Soviet submarines) aimed at the U.S. 
would travel into then beyond the 
atmosphere and then sharply down 
toward their american targets, arc-
ing above the altitude of Canadian air 
space. Unlike the extensive air defence 
installations that were once located in 
Canada, no system to detect or track 
ballistic missiles has ever been located 
there or operated by the Canadian mili-
tary. the US placed its missile warning 
radars on its own soil in alaska, in the 
United kingdom, in greenland, and in 
another factor that made this situation 
viable in Norad was that during the 
Cold war the United States did not 
actively deploy a BMd system (except 
brief ly in the 1970s, with a single BMd 
site). the prevailing view was that a 
BMd system could never be effective 
and that its very existence, especially 
if matched by a Soviet counterpart, 
would destabilize the nuclear balance 
of power which was based upon an 
assured destruction capability—that 
is, that neither superpower could gain 
from a first strike. as arms control 
advocates argued, the mere presence 
of a BMd capability might tempt one 
side to believe a first strike was possible. 
in the early 1970s, the U.S. and USSr 
American and Canadian personnel monitor activity in the North American maritime and air domains in the 
NORAD and U.S. Northern Command command center, Peterson Air Force Base, CO (Credit: Sgt 1st 
Class Gail Braymen)
space. despite this, Canadians remained 
involved in the Norad missile warn-
ing role. it is a bit of a puzzle why this 
is the case; the quality of Canadian 
personnel at Colorado Springs and our 
historical defence partnership offer only 
a partial explanation. it just may be, as a 
senior Canadian defense official mused 
before a Canadian parliamentary com-
mittee in 2000, that americans simply 
have developed a comfortable “habit” 
of working with Canadians in conti-
nental defense.
signed the antiballistic Missile defense 
treaty limiting BMd systems. while 
the Soviets deployed two BMd sites, 
the U.S. eventually dismantled its only 
BMd site. Canada welcomed this U.S. 
position on BMd and indeed in the 
1968 renewal of the Norad agree-
ment insisted that a clause be added 
which stated that participation in the 
bi-national command not obligate it to 
be involved in missile defence.
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in 1983, President ronald reagan 
launched his Strategic defense 
initiative (Sdi), and Canada was again 
faced with having to make an uncom-
fortable decision about Norad 
and missile defense. Sdi envisioned, 
amongst other things, space-based 
BMd interceptors (hence the pejorative 
appellation “Star wars”). when Canada 
was asked by the reagan administra-
tion if it wanted to officially participate 
in Sdi research, it declined, but there 
was no damage to Norad or overall 
U.S.-Canada defense relations. indeed, 
in 1985, the U.S. and Canada agreed 
to modernize Norad’s air defence 
capabilities, in part to deal with a new 
air threat: cruise missiles. in the end, 
reagan’s program ran into strong pub-
lic and Congressional opposition and 
the BMd issue faded away again as the 
Cold war ended. 
in the late 1990s, due to fears about 
North korean and iranian missile 
programs, the Clinton administration, 
this time pressed by Congress, moved 
to develop limited BMd capabilities 
to match the new limited threat. But 
the white house was not enthusiastic 
about forging ahead with an exten-
sive and expensive “National Missile 
defense” (NMd) system. Concern 
about the future of Norad in  
these years centered on the declining 
strategic relevance of traditional air 
defence, as the numbers of radar stations 
(only just recently modernized) and 
interceptor aircraft were cut back  
to bare minimums. 
this was the situation on September 11, 
2001 when, with the Canadian deputy 
Commander in charge, the order went 
out: “generate! generate! generate!” 
But Norad was not postured to deal 
with threats coming from inside the 
continent. in the days that followed, 
fighter aircraft on alert were deployed 
to 26 sites in the contiguous U.S., 
with a goal of providing 20-minute 
coverage of potential targets, includ-
ing major cities. though this extensive 
deployment was subsequently scaled 
back, Norad has occasionally 
provided coverage for special events 
in both the U.S. and Canada, such as 
the 2010 Vancouver olympic games 
and the g8/g20 summits. in addition, 
with american homeland security 
and defence assuming greater impor-
tance, the United States established a 
new unified command to cover North 
america, U.S. Northern Command 
(USNorthCoM), whose com-
mander also serves as commander of 
Norad. Canada was approached 
by the Pentagon about converting 
Norad into something bigger, 
a comprehensive North american 
defense arrangement but declined, 
electing instead to establish its own 
homeland defense arrangements.
in the post-9/11 war on terrorism, 
the george w. Bush administration 
renewed efforts for an NMd sys-
tem. it abrogated the U.S.-U.S.S.r. 
antiballistic Missile defense treaty 
in late 2001 and deployed a limited 
missile defense of the United States. 
again, Canada was approached to 
participate and in 2004 the government 
of Prime Minister Paul Martin agreed 
that Norad could support the new 
missile defense system. But a year later 
when the Bush administration asked if 
Canada would directly participate in 
BMd operations, the Martin gov-
ernment declined, yielding to public 
sentiment which remained suspicious of 
BMd and highly critical of the policies 
Flight test of a three-stage Ground-Based Interceptor from Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, 26 January 
2013 (Credit: Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Department of Defense). 
in the wake of 9/11… the 
Canadian government undertook 
a wide range of efforts to 
strengthen its internal security  
and worked with the U.S. to 
secure the border between the 
two countries.
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of george w. Bush. Beyond allowing 
Norad to provide warning informa-
tion to the interceptor missiles, Canada, 
and thus Norad remains uninvolved 
in BMd.
to be sure, ottawa does not wish to be 
a security liability to the U.S. in the war 
on terrorism. that war is Canada’s war 
too. in the wake of 9/11, not only did 
Canada immediately deploy forces to 
afghanistan, where they remained for 
over a decade, the Canadian govern-
ment undertook a wide range of efforts 
to strengthen its internal security and 
worked with the U.S. to secure the 
border between the two countries. as a 
July 2005 State department Background 
Note on Canada observed: “while law 
enforcement cooperation and coor-
dination were excellent prior to the 
terrorist attacks on the United States of 
September 11, they have since become 
even closer ... U.S.-Canada bilateral  
and multilateral cooperation in the 
fight is unequaled.” 
what’s more, the United States has 
been prepared to accommodate con-
tinuing Canadian aversion to bilateral 
cooperation in BMd. the newly 
elected Conservative government of 
Prime Minister Stephen harper was 
able to renew the Norad agreement 
in 2006 including an expansion of the 
Command’s mission to include mari-
time warning. Moreover, unlike all 
the previous renewals, this one has no 
expiry date. 
in Norad, then, Canada and the 
US appear to have established a firm, 
perennial institution with f lexibility 
enough to accommodate asymmetries 
in command at Colorado Springs. 
while Canada does not participate 
in the operation of missile defences, 
Canadians in Norad support the 
system by providing warning and 
assessment of any potential missile 
attack. this arrangement can lead to 
some oddities at Colorado Springs. For 
example, a Canadian general officer in 
command of Norad would be able 
to confirm that North america is under 
missile attack and provide the warn-
ing, but must leave it to an american to 
release the BMd interceptors. 
however, notwithstanding the 2006 
renewal and accommodation, the 
Canadian decision to stay out of BMd 
still leaves Norad’s future as a bi-
national command in jeopardy. this 
is because, as James Fergusson of the 
University of Manitoba points out 
in his 2010 book Canada and Ballistic 
Missile Defence, 1954-2009, “Norad’s 
early warning mission appear[s] at risk 
of becoming a redundancy.” known 
as integrated tactical warning and 
assessment or “itt/wa,” wherein air 
and missile warning and attack assess-
ment functions are brought together, 
early warning is at the very heart of 
Norad’s mission. and very recently, 
the stakes have been raised. the obama 
administration’s policy reversal on 
BMd and Secretary hagel’s announce-
ment of an expansion of the system 
indicates a new seriousness about mis-
sile defense that highlights the differ-
ences between washington and ottawa 
on BMd. if the U.S. proceeds with a 
more extensive BMd system, the exist-
ing accommodations within Norad 
to the continued Canadian aversion to 
BMd may not be possible nor in the 
United States’ best interest. americans 
may in other words get over their habit 
of cooperating with Canadians and 
decide to effectively gut Norad by 
unilaterally taking itt/wa away from 
the bi-national command. 
Giving Up the  
Anti-BMD Habit
today, the harper government has 
given no indication that it is consider-
ing pulling its own about face on BMd. 
But as the obama administration and 
its successor move forward in expand-
ing america’s ability to intercept 
missiles, ottawa may have no choice 
if it wishes to maintain Norad as 
a permanent and relevant substantive 
and symbolic fixture of american-
Canadian security cooperation. the 
price of sustaining the United States 
habit of cooperating with Canada in 
matters of continental defense is that 
Canadians give up their habit of reject-
ing ballistic missile defense. given the 
stakes involved, it seems a small price 
to pay.
the newly elected Conservative 
government of Prime Minister 
Stephen harper was able to renew 
the Norad agreement in 2006 
including an expansion of the 
Command’s mission to include 
maritime warning.
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